Navigating the Syrian Labyrinth

Key Players and Power Plays

Over the last week while most Americans were enjoying Thanksgiving with family and friends, major changes took place in Syria at a pace that has arguably not been seen since the rapid rise (and collapse) of the Islamic State in the mid-2010s. While the pace of events is so rapid that a lot of reports are obsolete hours afterwards, this post is going to aim to provide a primer on what has transpired in the last five days in Syria, who the major actors are on the ground, and discuss the implications/motivations of regional and world powers that are invested in the outcome of the conflict. The intent of this is to provide readers that may be hearing lots of news, narratives, and acronyms related to the fighting in Syria some foundational context.

What Has Transpired

Before getting into who the major groups and state stakeholders are in Syria, we’re going to take a brief look at what has happened in the last five days. Last Wednesday various Syrian groups in opposition to the Syrian government launched an offensive from their stronghold of Idlib, Syria. This offensive was primarily led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA) which should not be confused with the Syrian government’s army which is known as the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). Thus far, the offensive has primarily gone in two directions; east overwhelming the SAA in the city of Aleppo and south down the M5 highway towards the city of Hama.

The offensive is the first major attack against Assad’s forces since the 2020 Idlib ceasefire was agreed upon. To date the HTS and SNA have managed to gain control over the city of Aleppo along with 19 other towns and villages while also taking control of numerous SAA military facilities, seizing weapons storage. Below are some maps depicting the current lines and the scope of the offensive. It is worth noting that there have also been reports of protests and anti-Assad violence in the Daraa and Suwayda areas of Syria which are south of Damascus, bordering Jordan.

Why is all of this significant? Aleppo has always been a city of strategic importance for both Turkey and Syria, and Aleppo has historically been one of, if not the largest city in Syria. It is vital for anyone with the desire to control northern Syria, to have control over Aleppo. In addition to this, gains by HTS and the SNA will produce less favorable outcomes for Kurdish forces in the area which have already been surrounded and warned to leave the eastern Aleppo town of Tal Rifaat. At the moment HTS and the SNA have all of the momentum, and it is tough to assess what the outcome of all of this will mean for the future of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, and the significant strategic interests at stake for countries like Russia, Turkey, Israel, Iran, and the United States.

Key Actors & Their Sponsors

So, who are the primary groups engaged in the fighting right now? The first and most significant for Americans to be aware of is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) which translates to the “Organization for the Liberation of the Levant.” HTS has been particularly active around Aleppo and Hama. The organization has a Salafi-jihadist ideology, and was formerly known as the al-Qaeda affiliate al-Nusra Front and split from al-Qaeda in 2016. Despite their split from al-Qaeda, HTS is still labeled as a terrorist organization by the United States, European Union, and United Nations. HTS is led by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, who has led al-Nusra Front prior to the establishment of HTS as a group separate from al-Qaeda and has a $10 million bounty on his head.

In addition to HTS, the Syrian National Army (SNA) is heavily involved in this offensive but has a different focus than HTS. The SNA is a Turkish-backed armed umbrella group that operates in northern Syria and has participated in Turkish military operations in northern Syria since its creation. The SNA grew out of a coalition of multiple groups in Syria including former Free Syrian Army factions (FSA) and numerous Sunni extremist groups in Syria. While the HTS focuses primarily on the Syrian government, SNA is primarily focused on targeting Kurdish forces in and around Aleppo.

The other two belligerents at the moment are the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syrian Armed Forces with support from the Russian military and Iran. The SDF is a Kurdish led coalition of armed groups operating primarily in northeastern Syria with the support of the United States. The SDF is directly at odds with the SNA. Although the SDF has American backing and have Americans embedded with them, this is only the case to the east of the Euphrates River, which places the SDF west of the river in contact with the SNA without direct American support.

In short, HTS is the artist formerly known as al-Qaeda affiliate al-Nusra Front and is aligned with Turkish interests in Syria, although not directly affiliated with Turkey. The SNA is directly backed and tied to Turkey and is primarily focused on targeting Kurdish groups in northern Syria. Those Kurdish groups mostly fight under the banner of the SDF inside of Syria.

1) An SNA member places a Turkish flag on the Citadel of Aleppo. 2-4) Anti-Assad groups plundering weapons stores on Syrian bases.

Regional & Global Interests & Reactions

Regionally and globally this conflict zone always has been one of the most complex geopolitical balls of yarn in the world, and present day is no different. In this section I am going to focus on the states most directly tied to the current fighting. Covering the pro-Assad side first and anti-Assad side second and then focusing on the reactions and interests of states indirectly involved. Before jumping into that, take a second to appreciate how many foreign military bases and assets are operating inside of Syria, as of mid-2024.

On the side of the Assad government is Russia and Iran. For the Iranians, Syria has been a major operating area and bridge to its client in Lebanon, Hezbollah. The loss of Assad in Syria would be a complete disaster for the Iranians in terms of their ability to threaten Israel and to compete their regional rival, Turkey. Right now, the Iranians are mobilizing support for the Assad regime so it should be expected that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), IRGC-Quds Force (IRGC-QF), and Iranian Aligned Militia Groups to be heavily involved in a defense of the Assad regime.

Zooming out a bit, there is quite a bit at stake in this fight for Russia. First and foremost, Russia has numerous large military bases inside of Syria. Perhaps the most strategically important is the Russian Navy base in Tartus, Syria. This base is the Russian Navy’s only major naval base outside of the former Soviet Union and without it, the Russian navy has great deal of its capability in the Black and Baltic Seas, requiring access to NATO controlled chokepoints such as the Bosporus & Dardanelles Straits and Danish Straits. Power projection in the maritime domain is significantly handicapped for Russia without Tartus. In addition to this, Russia has significant air bases and air defenses in Syria. From a geopolitical rivalry perspective, the loss of Assad would greatly diminish Russia’s relative standing compared to its regional rival Turkey, and its global rival, the United States.

On the anti-Assad side of things, Turkey is primary force driving fighting at the moment through the proxies of the HTS and SNA. Turkey’s primary interest is control of northern Syria and the destruction of Kurdish forces operating there. Control of this region would also give Turkey the opportunity to resettle many of the refugees that have been in Turkey since the start of the Syrian Civil War over a decade ago. In addition to this, Turkey would benefit from the weakening of Russian influence in the region, and this would go hand in hand with weakening or defeating the Assad regime.

Shifting to states not directly involved, the offensive benefits Israel by weakening the Iran-Syria axis and disrupting the weapons pipeline to Hezbollah. However, Israel has to remain cautious about the possibility of Turkish-backed Islamists coming to power in Syria or the possibility of Syria falling into a greater state of disorder that could be used by Islamist groups to train and plan attacks while hiding in the chaos. Iraq and the United Arab Emirates have indicated support for Assad. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are also presumed to support the Syrian regime, given their wariness of Islamist political groups backed by Turkey. For Egypt and Saudi Arabia in particular, they have to balance their wariness of Islamist political groups backed by Turkey with their desire to weaken Iran’s relative power in the region.

Lastly, the United States is in an odd position with a lame duck administration in charge until January 20th, 2025. Right now, is a time where it would be deemed inappropriate by many, based on historical precedent, for the United States to take major action regarding conflict in the world. Of course, that hasn’t stopped major escalatory decisions from being made relating to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, so maybe that is just wishful, outdated thinking. Either way, I contend that the primary American interest in the region is the denial of fertile Islamist planning and training areas through the establishment of order. This is the primary direct threat to the United States in this area and it can be dramatically lessened through the minimization of failed states or lawless areas. Just beneath this in priority are all of the American regional interests that matter but simply aren’t as direct of a threat as the primary interest outlined above is. The reduction of Russian influence and strength in the region that would result from a weakened or removed Assad could benefit the United States and its partners in the region, so long as what fills the void isn’t going to increase the direct threat of Islamist to the United States.

With this in mind, the Sullivan-Blinken duo is in quite a geopolitical pretzel at the moment. Greater Turkish control over regions in Syria could increase regional order and stability, but the cost would be the annihilation of America’s Kurdish partners. Their lame duck status should prevent major American operations and constrain the US to defending Kurdish positions with their presence and interdicting Iranian militias attempting to enter the Syrian battlespace from Iraq, but whether it will be is unknown.